Greetings from Georgia -- Part 3 (email from October 2006)

A good friend and interested party recently suggested that since Georgia is in the midst of a diplomatic crisis that's splashed across the headlines of the international press, maybe I might want to use my $100,000 SAIS degree to talk a little more about the political situation in the country rather than analyzing local dating habits in excruciating detail. With elections set for tomorrow and our E-Day planned already mapped out, I am happy to oblige (though I'm assuming most of you won't make it through to the end.. I promise the next update will return to less weighty topics).

First of all, let me say that on the ground in Kutaisi and the surrounding area of central Georgia, there is absolutely no evidence or even discussion of the diplomatic crisis with Russia. I have been getting my news from the same sources I would get at home—English and Russian-language newspapers online. What I do have access to here beyond the news is a close-up view of the domestic political landscape, which is very useful in putting this "crisis" in context. Of course I need to throw out the disclaimer that I'm talking as myself, as someone who has studied conflict and knows Georgia well, and not at all as a representative of the OSCE or its Limited Election Observation Mission to Georgia. The OSCE report will likely wind up saying something completely different than what I tell you now and that's not because the organization is biased or basing its conclusions on higher political goals, but because I am speaking as one person with a distinct perspective from a specific space in Georgia, while the OSCE report will have to synthesize my view with the different perspectives of the 25 other observers in 11 other locations across the country to draw its final conclusions.

(Domestic Context)

What I've been doing with my days for the past few weeks is going out to district capitals in the Imereti region (my area of responsibility in central Georgia) to interview election officials, representatives of political parties, initiative group candidates who are running without a party behind them, coordinators of local election-related NGOs and journalists from the local media about the upcoming municipal elections in Georgia that will be held tomorrow. These will be the first local government elections to be held since the Rose Revolution toppled Shevardnadze's semi-authoritarian regime and brought young, charismatic Columbia-educated Mikhail Saakashvili and his United National Movement (UNM) party to power. Since taking office Saakashvili has made questionable amendments to the Georgian Constitution that have in large part eliminated the checks on his executive power from the other branches of government and centralized power in the presidency. This makes these elections particularly important because they represent the first chance to decentralize power from Tbilisi, allowing citizens to identify their own local needs and actively steer their own development.

What I can say conclusively from everything I've observed on the ground is that Georgia right now is by all definitions a one-party state. Saakashvili's UNM dominates the political landscape, while the remaining opposition parties are small, weak, fragmented and disorganized and present no real competition to the UNM. One woman interviewed suggested that the feeling throughout the country is that there "should only be one party" and that members of the opposition are shunned. The question is whether Saakashvili and his party have achieved this dominance through authoritarian or democratic means. Is the opposition weak because there is such overwhelming support for Saakashvili and his party or is Saakashvili deliberately squelching the opposition before they have a chance to develop into real competition for him? It is a little of both I am afraid.

On the one hand, Saakashvili and his party are extremely popular and with good reason. People are thrilled to have for the first time since the Soviet era reliable electricity, well-paved roads, a disciplined police force, freshly painted buildings, new stadiums and even an amusement park in addition to an actual vision for the country's future. Saakashvili has made his goals explicitly clear: he wants to restore Georgia's territorial integrity (by reincorporating the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia back into Georgia), join NATO and move toward EU membership. And he has made a lot of smart, responsible decisions that have led to significant, tangible improvements in the quality of life throughout the country. He has spent a lot of time in the west, knows exactly what he wants his country to look like and is taking real steps to make this vision a reality.

On the other hand, rather than simply campaigning on their achievements and ideas and riding the resultant wave of popular support, Saakashvili and his party are playing many of the old style political games to hold onto and consolidate their power. The first tell-tale sign of this was of course Saakashvili's amendments to the Constitution. I of all impatient goal-oriented people can definitely understand the appeal of centralizing decision making power so that things get done efficiently and effectively without the battle of compromise slowing down progress and watering down ideas. But the point of democracy, the cornerstone of the EU, is for the people to decide in which direction their country goes and how it gets there, not a single leader, no matter how clever or progressive he and his ideas may or may not be. It is fine for Saakashvili to put forward and implement a revolutionary agenda, but the people need to support it from among a range of options put forward by other clever candidates.

Unfortunately, it seems that Saakashvili in fear that his revolutionary agenda might not win in free competition, has been biasing the electoral playing field in favor of his party. To start, there was the announcement of the election date. For months Saakashvili and his government officials had been publicly announcing that local elections would be held in December 2006. Lulled by the certainty of press release after press release mentioning December elections, all international organizations and local opposition parties began making their plans (and procrastinations) accordingly. Then, over a public holiday in late August, Saakashvili posted a press release to the government website in the middle of the night saying that elections would actually be held on October 5 with the bare minimum of 40 days notice. The lack of subtlety in this move may be comically childish to us outsiders, but the impact of the unexpectedly short timeframe has had real impact on the opposition's ability to organize themselves, find funding and candidates and form coalitions, giving Saakashvili's UNM a distinct advantage from the outset.    

Saakashvili has also employed very questionable tactics in his campaign, intentionally blurring the line between party and government. The most flagrant example of this is his changing and use of the national flag. When I lived in Georgia the national flag was maroon. Four years later Saakashvili and his party campaigned as the United National Movement under the banner of a white flag with red crosses in the lead up to the Rose Revolution as well as in the parliamentary and presidential elections that followed thereafter. After winning by a landslide, Saakashvili changed the old maroon Georgian national flag to the UNM white flag with red crosses. This flag now flies in front of all municipal buildings alongside the EU flag (very wishful thinking, Misha). He has had all maroon flags throughout Georgia replaced with his white flag with red crosses, repainting parks and buildings to invoke the new symbol of Georgia. And the effect is creepy: everywhere you look you see the flag and think "National Movement" but then have to remind yourself that it is not completely inappropriate for the Chairman of an Election Commission to fly the National Movement flag because it is now the Georgian flag. Moreover, rather than changing the UNM party flag to something new and different, UNM is currently campaigning under the banner of the national white flag with red crosses and the EU flag paired together. These two flags are now used as the symbols of the UNM party and appear in front of all of their party offices and on all of their party posters and pamphlets. Of course, this is what flies in front of all government and municipal building as well. As a result, the white flag with red crosses paired with the EU flag is meant to represent at the same time the country, the country's future, the government and the UNM party as if they are all inseparable concepts. Again, the feeling that you get from this messaging is that there "should" be only one party—that another party would stop progress in its tracks and that no other government could work for the good of the country or lead it in the direction of Europe.

Another dirty campaign trick that further blurs this line has been the opening of UNM soup kitchens throughout the country to provide meals to the poor. If you ask someone on the street about the soup kitchens, they will say "Look how wonderful! This is what Saakashvili and his party do—they take care of those in need." They do not understand the provision of such services as the government's responsibility but as Saakashvili's charity. Rather than feeling entitled to government services from any administration that might come to power, they feel fortunate to have the benevolence of the UNM and Saakashvili. It is unclear whether the funding for the soup kitchens is coming from the state budget and being falsely attributed to the UNM party, which would be a flagrant misuse of administrative resources and against the law. However, if not, it is still clearly stated in the election law that a party is not allowed to provide anything of tangible benefit to the citizens during the campaign period, which makes the soup kitchens illegal even if they are funded with party money. A party is supposed to campaign and win on ideas and platforms. Yes, a ruling party can point to its past achievements, but these soup kitchens only serve to reinforce Saakashvili's blurring of party, government and state.

Finally, there comes the part that is highly contested and debatable. There are rumors throughout Georgia that Saakashvili has put the message out to his party that they must win every seat in the local government and that they should use every means at their disposal to do so, fair or unfair, legal or illegal. We have heard countless reports from the opposition about UNM party members pressuring opposition and independent candidates to withdraw from the elections. And in a large percentage of districts UNM candidates are running uncontested following the withdrawal of opposition candidates. The opposition describes a pattern in which the UNM party members, usually working in the current local administration, first offer the candidate a very nice job with a high salary in the next administration if he withdraws from the race. If the candidate does not take the bait, the UNM member will threaten to make sure that the candidate and all of the candidate's relatives who are currently working will be fired if he does not withdraw. Because such a high percentage of those employed are working for the administration directly or in state-funded facilities, this is a very credible threat. The opposition also claims that the UNM has threatened to shut down local businesses that fund the opposition or independent candidates. Meanwhile, we have also heard accusations that the UNM has threatened whole villages that if the UNM candidate does not win there, their village will never see any government resources as well as that the UNM has had heads of factories and schools tells their employees that they will lose their jobs and shopkeepers that they will lose their licenses if they do not vote UNM. The opposition is saying that the pressure on them now is far greater than it ever was under Shevardnadze.

However, these rumors are slippery and for the most part unsubstantiated. Saakashvili and the UNM have spread the counter-rumor throughout the country that the opposition is making these claims of pressure and intimidation solely to discredit the election results because they know that they will lose. The Industry Will Save Georgia party is backing up the UNM claims that everything is running smoothly and fairly in an atmosphere free of pressure. But then again the opposition is claiming that the Industry Will Save Georgia party is just a puppet party co-opted by Saakashvili and the UNM. People on the street are saying that you would have to be crazy to be a member of or vote for a party other than Saakashvili's because he is doing such great things for the country and they say so with fanatic enthusiasm. It is impossible to say for certain who is telling the truth.

Whatever the case, whether Saakashvili and the UNM are maintaining power through dodgy or democratic means, the end result will be the same in tomorrow's elections. The UNM will win the vast majority if not the full 100% of seats in the local governments consolidating Saakashvili's power even further throughout the country. This will allow him to plot out and implement any agenda that he dreams up, whether well-planned and healthy for the country or extremist and dangerous for the world. The only checks on Saakashvili's power as of tomorrow will come solely from the feedback of the international community in the form of support or scolding.

(International Impact)

Against this backdrop, the timing of the diplomatic incident with Russia begins to make some sense. The incident, in case you haven't heard, occurred last week when the Georgian government boldly and unexpectedly arrested four Russian military officials on accusations of espionage. Russia overreacted by cutting off all air, rail, sea, road and postal links with Georgia. The OSCE has since stepped in to defuse tensions by taking the prisoners from Georgian custody, holding their hands on the flight over the border and depositing them with the Russian authorities for their prompt release.

While many claim that relations between Russia and Georgia have deteriorated over the years, I would say that they have for the most part not changed at all since I left Tbilisi in 1999. That is, they remain as theatrical and childish as ever. Georgia still makes a habit of over-dramatizing the threat of a Russian plot to destabilize its government and reclaim control of its territory. They usually do so to drive up support for the current administration's latest policy or deflect attention from its latest failure. Meanwhile, Russia over-dramatizes the threat of a western conspiracy to co-opt Georgia and push a hegemonic US agenda on Russia from its borders. They make jabs at the Georgian government and economy like cutting off gas in the winter, banning the import of Georgian wine into Russia, or as of now suspending all travel rights and postal service between the countries just to remind the Georgians in whose backyard they are living and who has the power to tangibly impact their quality of everyday life. This of course feeds into the Georgian threat perception and the vicious cycle continues in a fairly comical way. A journalist friend here recently lamented that "it's like reporting on a fight between kindergarteners in the playground every week."

Thus, for those of us who have been reading about "deteriorations," "escalations" and "provocations" for years the latest "crisis" is not particularly interesting news. What IS interesting news, however, is that it has made the international headlines. Assuming that Saakashvili has read all of the same political sciences literature that I have, this fact gives me a great deal of pause in dismissing the incident outright, as I otherwise would. The incident was clearly an orchestrated move by Saakashvili to provoke the Russians into acting out against Georgia, but why now, why the media attention and what comes next?

First of all by way of an explanation, there is nothing like an outside threat six days before an election to mobilize voters in favor of the current government that has been successfully shielding them from said threat. Goading Russia into acting against Georgia on the eve of the elections is fully in line with Saakashvili's above-detailed desire to maximize his domestic power. But what exactly is it that Saakashvili wants to do with this unbridled power once he claims it tomorrow and how does a well-publicized threat from Russia forward that agenda?

Saakashvili has made his goals for Georgia explicitly clear. He wants to restore the territorial integrity of the country, join NATO and move toward EU membership. While many of you are likely scoffing at the ludicrously ambitious if not flat-out delusional idea of wild, backward Georgia becoming an EU member state, those of you who know Georgia realize that getting the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to return to the Georgian state is just as far-fetched a goal. Abkhazia and South Ossetia broke away from Georgia after the fall of the Soviet Union heralded the democratic election of a nasty ethnic nationalist regime in Georgia. They have been self-governing independent entities for nearly 15 years now with strong ties to Russia that include military support and zero interest in returning to the Georgian state.

Sound familiar? It might. Because structurally the situations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are directly parallel to the situation in Kosovo. Kosovo was an autonomous province within the republic of Serbia within the greater conferderation of Yugoslavia. Abkhazia and South Ossetia were autonomous provinces within the republic of Georgia within the greater confederation of the Soviet Union. When the multi-state frameworks of Yugoslavia and the USSR broke down, Serbia and Georgia became independent states. Both elected ethnically nationalist governments which alienated their minority populations and Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia asserted their right to break away. Kosovo sought the help of the west in this effort while Abkhazia and South Ossetia sought the help of the Russians. This is overly simplified of course, but it is in essence the same game with the teams reversed.

And we know which outcome the US favors in the game between Kosovo and Serbia. It is widely known and well-documented (though still vehemently denied) that the US is pushing hard for Kosovo to be granted independence by the end of this year. For years Russia has protested this outcome siding with its Slavic Serbian brothers in fear that the precedent might be applied to Chechnya . However, with a co-opted Chechen regime stabilizing the situation in Chechnya, Russia has recently turned the tables on the US. They are now saying ok, fine, give Kosovo independence but this will set a clear precedent to be applied in Georgia, entitling Abkhazia and South Ossetia to independence. The US loves Georgia, a Christian nation willing to at least speak in the rhetoric of human rights and democracy on the doorstep of both Russia and the Middle East whose current president's Columbia law school education they so benevolently funded with a State Department fellowship. And they would hate to see Georgia concede its rightful territory to Russian influenced independence (as much as Russia hates to see Serbia concede its rightful territory to American influenced independence—and who said the Cold War was over?).

What this means is that the clock is ticking and time is running out for Saakashvili to reassert some semblance of control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia before Kosovo is granted independence by year's end. Many analysts have speculated that he may even be gunning to employ the newly US-trained Georgian military in starting a war to win back the territories by force. But even with new equipment and tactics, can the tiny little Georgian military really win against the huge nuclear-backed Russian forces?

No, definitely not. However, this did not stop the Kosovo Albanians and it may not stop the Georgians from trying. Not from trying to win mind you, but from trying to provoke disproportionate retaliation, win the hearts and minds of the western public and court international intervention into the conflict. In what could become the first example of Kuperman's moral hazard theory employed by one state against another, Georgia may intend to provoke Russia with enough little jabs of force until Russia gets so frustrated that it uses its proportionally greater force against the smaller state. Having already familiarized the western audience with the black-and-white struggle between Georgian good guys and Russian bad guys, Georgia can then point the finger at the big bad human rights violating Slavic menace across the international media and cry for US and/or international military assistance to come save them. Such assistance could include accelerated accession into NATO to protect Georgia from the threat of Russian reoccupation, if not military intervention into the conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by international rather than Russian peacekeeping forces. Provoking Russia could be Saakashvili's fast-track to achieving at least one if not two or even all three of his goals in one fell swoop. If he can get Russia or the Russian-backed Abkhaz or Ossetians to attack Georgia, he sets the stage for the US to intervene and then push their shared political agenda swiftly through the pipeline (so to speak).

Of course, maybe in consuming a daily diet of conspiracy theory here in Georgia I am simply manufacturing a fairly ludicrous one of my own. However, on the off chance that there is a grain of truth to my thinking, hopefully every party will be smarter in playing the moral hazard game this time around. In this case, Russia needs to be very careful not to play into Georgia's hand by overreacting to provocations with displays of force. As importantly, Russia needs to play the international media card with as much savvy as the Georgians, making sure that they get their views and their voice into all of the mainstream media outlets. They cannot allow themselves to get pegged as black against Georgia's white.

Meanwhile, the US government needs to get over its current conception of old alliances and start basing its international policy on shared principles and values rather than hunches and grudges, likes and dislikes. The US claims Georgia as an ally in the struggle of western democracy against Putin's authoritarian abuse of human rights. However, to do so they have to blindly ignore the uncanny resemblance that Saakashvili's Georgia bears to Putin's Russia. While Saakashvili may be claiming that his end goal is the democracy and human rights paradise of the EU, he is certainly staking out an authoritarian path to get there. The US cannot keep squandering the dying remains of its credibility by promoting hypocritical policies. The whole world sees what we're doing and it's not only embarrassing, it's dangerous. If Georgia is in fact our ally, we need to show it some tough love by demanding political reform.

Moreover, the EU needs to assert itself against the US more effectively and start calling the shots in its "neighborhood." Europe will have to live with the consequences of renewed wars in the Caucasus in the same way that it bore the brunt of the wars in the Balkans. Hopefully, everyone will be able to recognize the pointlessness of the Balkan wars that only served to complicate rather than clarify borders and positions at the cost of many innocent lives, as a fundamental lesson. Is it so hard to come up with an institutionalized solution to standardize and regulate how borders change and what happens to states and sub-states when multi-state frameworks collapse? Couldn't the terms and conditions be negotiated democratically hammered out by technocrats with full and fair participation at the international level in a way that all states agree to the rules and tons of future wars are obviated? Do politics always have to be such ad hoc cowboy nonsense or could we actually apply the principles that we claim to believe in to promote enduring peaceful relations and understanding among the human race?

Clearly, time for me to go to bed...

with love from Kutaisi,

Leslie