That said, here are my options: Project number one, formerly inspired by my weekend in Moscow and reconnection with the elite scene of ex-pats in whose company I love to guiltily indulge myself at the expense of connecting with local people in capitals around the world, and the associated Moscow crush that has since fizzled into a more flaccid form of friendship, would be an in-depth ethnographic look at the World Bank and EU projects in the different republics of the Volga region. In Kazan, for instance, the Bank sponsored a project to tear down some Khrushev era apartment complexes near the center of town and relocate all the residents to newly constructed buildings in another district. There are all kinds of rumors flying around about the why and the who of these relocations in addition to the ethical concerns of uprooting people that could make for an interesting investigation. And I think if I were able to talk with the people at the Bank in DC and Moscow about their perception of the project, lay out all of their documentation and its inevitable gibberish about sustainable development and capacity building, interview Russian and Tatar officials who helped with the implementation here and then go talk at length with the residents who were actually moved, spending time in the buildings where they’re now living, I might actually be able to document the contrast between the “simulacrum” of progress laid out in the Bank’s official records that normal academics or policy makers would use for making conclusions and decisions and the lived reality of what happened to the moved community on the ground in Kazan. That’s only one World Bank project of course. I would root out the others in this region and hopefully they would take me to strange places where I could document a similar clash of cultures between the jet set English-speaking internationals parachuting in to hand over ridiculous sums of money to dubious local officials and NGOs to implement projects likely ill-tailored to the communities they are meant to serve. It would be more political anthropology than political science, which is probably better suited to my less mathematical, more narrative strengths anyway, and it would play into much of what I’ve already seen and take issue with in the world.
Project number two, formerly inspired by the crush on my Russian grammar teacher that also fizzled out for reasons of its own, is a look at norms around sex, dating, marriage and divorce across the different cultures, economic situations, exposure to western culture and urban-rural divides of the region, maybe throwing in Moscow as well to show the contrast (or lack thereof) between sex and relationship norms in the capital, regional capitals, small towns and villages—kind of Sex in the former Soviet Union. This you might say is even less political than the last topic. And you might be right. But the motivation comes from a not entirely large N, but certainly not indeterminate sample of romantic encounters with men from the post-Soviet space and the radically different way they approach sex and relationships, which I think I could argue and hopefully even show with some clever survey research, is highly correlated with illiberal political attitudes deeply entrenched in the society. Ok, that last sentence employed far too much jargon for most normal people. This is the idea: some people have said that “we” as the US or the West or the international community, take your pick, don’t actually care about spreading “democracy” in the world, but we care about other societies adopting our ideology of liberalism under which the state protects the rights of all citizens as free and equal individuals. These individuals are allowed to bobble along through space and time making individual choices for themselves, being as crazy and creative as they like, as long as they don’t break any laws or get in the way of other individuals. It plays into our much beloved Adam Smith’s economic idea that each person blindly pursuing his own self-interests will lead to the best outcome for society. Politically and economically, the power of choice is decentralized to the individual who gets to express his truest desires. This is very different from the paternalist authoritarian perspective still alive and well in countries like Russia where the state like a good parent or overbearing husband knows what is best for its citizens and attempts to limit their individual freedoms of expression and assembly and so on in the name of stability and the better interests of society. I think, and admittedly a little wackily so, that you can see the same pattern play out in personal relationships. In the West, our philosophy of romance is very individual driven. Love and lust are imagined as forces that come from within and propel us each toward one another as unique independent actors. There is this capitalist period of dating in which you try people on for size and are very likely to return them to the store before you find “the one.” Bodies come together and come apart with relative ease. Moreover, once you are in a relationship it’s ideally built on mutual trust and belief in a love that is bigger than you both, keeping you together. A relationship is “bad” if instead one member is constantly worrying about the other’s love or fidelity and “really bad,” even illegal, if that commitment is enforced with psychological or physical abuse. And since we’re all individuals on unique paths, it’s possible if not likely that two people each pursuing their own interests will grow apart, in which case, a divorce is preferable to dissimulation, and there’s hopefully a new “one” around the next corner better matched to this new version of you. My experience dating post-Soviet men and listening to girls and women of all ages talk about their experiences has revealed quite the opposite. For one, there is no concept of dating, certainly no concept of dating, having sex and then moving on to the next guy, not for a girl at least. You get who you get in a likely uninformed choice made at a young age heavily influenced by your parents, you marry him and you make do. The sex is awful. There is no playfulness of spirit, no fun, no romance, no foreplay and no social or moral imperative for the guy to worry about the girl’s pleasure. And I think this can in part be attributed to the fact that there’s no competition in the dating market—girl’s aren’t making decisions about who they’ll marry based on how good the guy is in bed so there’s no incentive for him to develop skills or knowledge about how to please her. Moreover, the dynamics of the relationship are based on crazy levels of jealousy. Freedoms are restricted and the commitment is policed rather than just assumed. There is no trust. There are constant accusations of infidelity. Every action is watched. It is absolutely illiberal in every way, just like the authoritarian government assumes the worst of every individual and devotes far too many resources to watching and policing for signs of infidelity. And I think that I could use all of my political psychology training to put together a survey with embedded experiments that might be able to show the correlation between illiberal attitudes toward sex and toward political authority, which could potentially show some interesting differences across ethnicities, religions, class and geography, might let me make some greater kookie point about the deeper internalization of political values, which I could maybe make more political by tying to women's unwillingness to allow the state to empower and protect them in their personal relationships, and which would definitely hold my interest as long as I worked on it.
The third project, which actually did descend out of nowhere and very temporarily gave me that feeling of “I need to do this” sounds so boring after the last two that I can barely bare to write about it. It’s looking at the provision of minority language schooling in several of the different ethnic republics and one of the Russian provinces in the region. The federal government has been trying to standardize education in line with Putin’s greater centralizing reforms and in some articles I have read that this threatens the provision of local language schooling in the ethnic republics. For example, in Tatarstan right now, even though only 50% of the population is ethnically Tatar, all students are required to study and pass proficiency exams in Tatar language. The center does not like this, the Russians in Kazan grumble about it terribly, meanwhile, the Tatars think that just as Estonia and Uzbekistan require all citizens to speak Estonian and Uzbek, Tatarstan as an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation is entitled to the same right. Meanwhile, in Mari El, where there are fewer Mari and more ethnic Russians running the government and allegedly suppressing the expression of Mari culture, not only are non-ethnic-Mari students not required to learn Mari, but the Mari students may not have the option of studying their native language in school at all. Who knows what is going on in the allegedly more mild-mannered and democratic Chuvashia or in the ethnic villages of the Russian province of Ulyanovsk. The project would therefore be going out to lots of villages of different ethnicities in different federal units and mapping out which languages are actually taught where. That is, if I go out to a Russian village in Tatarstan, are they really complying with the regional government’s requirement that all students study Tatar or are they falling into line with the center and only teaching Russian? If I go out to a Tatar village in Mari El are they subverting the federal directive and teaching Tatar, are they able to do this with help from the government of Tatarstan, and are the Mari able to do the same? It’s a question of who has more control in the periphery—the central, regional or local governments—to actually change the reality on the ground. This project only works, however, if the center really is trying to squelch minority language schooling and I am having a hard time getting a straight story on this. No one here in Kazan claims to know anything about the change in the law. I’ve found and translated the law and can see that everywhere it previously said “regional standards” or “state” has been struck and replaced with “federal standards” and “federal state.” However, the federal standards are really ambiguously and crazily worded and I can’t seem to figure out if the center has actually tried at all to enforce the law in a way that is trying to get rid of minority language instruction. All of the misinformation and vagueness might be part of the story though. I imagine if I found a completely strange patchwork of who is implementing the law where, I could tell a story not only about the relative balance of power between the central, regional and local governments but also about how Moscow’s assertion of a power vertical extending from the Kremlin to the villages is more of a smokescreen that everyone buys into because they never actually go out to the regions let alone villages to inspect the reality on the ground. Even though there’s something that seems a little dull or dry or even misconceived (I mean, what if the law really isn’t trying to thwart minority language schooling at all) about this project, I like the straightforward structure that it would give me. I could approach it like an election mission, divide up the territory, get in a car and go out to villages every day to interview officials, teachers, parents and whoever else is around to talk to me. And in doing this very systematically I might stumble onto some other pattern or phenomenon of interest out in the villages that I wouldn’t necessarily find skulking around Kazan, which even though I complain about it endlessly as if it is the end of the world, claims to be Russia’s “third capital.”
Thus, I leave you still undecided. In the midst of writing up the third project in prospectus form just to get something submitted and approved. About to take the leap into actual research in two weeks time. Gulp. Feedback, as always, much welcome. And I promise next time to pass along more entertaining stories from life in Kazan rather than force feeding you further unsavory angst and gristly bits of dissertation stew!
The third project, which actually did descend out of nowhere and very temporarily gave me that feeling of “I need to do this” sounds so boring after the last two that I can barely bare to write about it. It’s looking at the provision of minority language schooling in several of the different ethnic republics and one of the Russian provinces in the region. The federal government has been trying to standardize education in line with Putin’s greater centralizing reforms and in some articles I have read that this threatens the provision of local language schooling in the ethnic republics. For example, in Tatarstan right now, even though only 50% of the population is ethnically Tatar, all students are required to study and pass proficiency exams in Tatar language. The center does not like this, the Russians in Kazan grumble about it terribly, meanwhile, the Tatars think that just as Estonia and Uzbekistan require all citizens to speak Estonian and Uzbek, Tatarstan as an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation is entitled to the same right. Meanwhile, in Mari El, where there are fewer Mari and more ethnic Russians running the government and allegedly suppressing the expression of Mari culture, not only are non-ethnic-Mari students not required to learn Mari, but the Mari students may not have the option of studying their native language in school at all. Who knows what is going on in the allegedly more mild-mannered and democratic Chuvashia or in the ethnic villages of the Russian province of Ulyanovsk. The project would therefore be going out to lots of villages of different ethnicities in different federal units and mapping out which languages are actually taught where. That is, if I go out to a Russian village in Tatarstan, are they really complying with the regional government’s requirement that all students study Tatar or are they falling into line with the center and only teaching Russian? If I go out to a Tatar village in Mari El are they subverting the federal directive and teaching Tatar, are they able to do this with help from the government of Tatarstan, and are the Mari able to do the same? It’s a question of who has more control in the periphery—the central, regional or local governments—to actually change the reality on the ground. This project only works, however, if the center really is trying to squelch minority language schooling and I am having a hard time getting a straight story on this. No one here in Kazan claims to know anything about the change in the law. I’ve found and translated the law and can see that everywhere it previously said “regional standards” or “state” has been struck and replaced with “federal standards” and “federal state.” However, the federal standards are really ambiguously and crazily worded and I can’t seem to figure out if the center has actually tried at all to enforce the law in a way that is trying to get rid of minority language instruction. All of the misinformation and vagueness might be part of the story though. I imagine if I found a completely strange patchwork of who is implementing the law where, I could tell a story not only about the relative balance of power between the central, regional and local governments but also about how Moscow’s assertion of a power vertical extending from the Kremlin to the villages is more of a smokescreen that everyone buys into because they never actually go out to the regions let alone villages to inspect the reality on the ground. Even though there’s something that seems a little dull or dry or even misconceived (I mean, what if the law really isn’t trying to thwart minority language schooling at all) about this project, I like the straightforward structure that it would give me. I could approach it like an election mission, divide up the territory, get in a car and go out to villages every day to interview officials, teachers, parents and whoever else is around to talk to me. And in doing this very systematically I might stumble onto some other pattern or phenomenon of interest out in the villages that I wouldn’t necessarily find skulking around Kazan, which even though I complain about it endlessly as if it is the end of the world, claims to be Russia’s “third capital.”
Thus, I leave you still undecided. In the midst of writing up the third project in prospectus form just to get something submitted and approved. About to take the leap into actual research in two weeks time. Gulp. Feedback, as always, much welcome. And I promise next time to pass along more entertaining stories from life in Kazan rather than force feeding you further unsavory angst and gristly bits of dissertation stew!



